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Available online xxxxIn light of the Aichi target to manage protected areas equitably by 2020, we ask how the conservation sector
should be incorporating concerns for social justice. We focus in particular on ‘recognition’, because it is the
least well understood aspect of environmental justice, and yet highly relevant to conservation because of its con-
cernwith respect for local knowledge and cultures. In order to explore the meaning of recognition in the conser-
vation context, we take four main steps. First, we identify four components of recognition to serve as our
analytical framework: subjects of justice, the harms that constitute injustice, themechanisms that produce injus-
tices, and the responses to alleviate these. Secondly, we apply this framework to explore four traditions of think-
ing about recognition: Hegelian intersubjectivity, critical theory, southern decolonial theory, and the capabilities
approach. Thirdly, we provide three case studies of conservation conﬂicts highlighting how different theoretical
perspectives are illustrated in the claims and practices of real world conservation struggles. Fourthly, we ﬁnish
the paper by drawing out some key differences between traditions of thinking, but also important areas of con-
vergence. The convergences provide a basis for concluding that conservation should look beyond a distributive
model of justice to incorporate concerns for social recognition, including careful attention to ways to pursue
equality of status for local conservation stakeholders. This will require reﬂection on working practices and
looking at forms of intercultural engagement that, for example, respect alternative ways of relating to nature
and biodiversity.
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Biodiversity conservation1. Introduction
Concerns about equity and justice1 have become prominent in de-
bates about conservation. These concerns include questions about
how we distribute costs, beneﬁts, rights and responsibilities, questions
about howwe give voice to different cultures and beliefs, and questions
about how we make trade-offs between current and future people, be-
tween individual rights and the greater good, and between humans and
non-humans (Brechin et al., 2002; Norton, 2003; Shoreman-Ouimet
and Kopnina, 2015). Working to improve ‘conservation justice’ isBiological Diversity (CBD) be-
the rest of the paper we prefer
gnition’. Environmental ‘justice’
distribution and participation,
imension of justice that passes
ink should be brought into theconsidered ethically desirable, but also instrumental to improved con-
servation effectiveness because it reduces the likelihood of conﬂict
(Martin et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2014; Suiseeya, 2014) or improves
participation (Coolsaet, 2015). But determining what constitutes ‘con-
servation justice’ is not easy. It is not enough to consult national or inter-
national laws to determinewhat is just because it is often perfectly legal
to subject people to harms arising from pollution, deforestation, climate
change, or indeed harms arising from the establishment of protected
areas (Smith and Pangsapa, 2008). Thus conservation has to look be-
yond the judiciary for its moral compass.
This paper contributes to understanding what this moral compass
should look like: how should we frame our thinking about conservation
justice? In doing so it particularly highlights the need to incorporate the
dimension of recognition. Contemporary academic framings of environ-
mental justice tend to use a tripartite typology of concerns: distribution,
procedure and recognition (Schlosberg, 2004; Sikor, 2013; Walker,
2012). Distribution refers to differences between stakeholders in
terms of who enjoys rights to material beneﬁts and who bears costs
and responsibilities. Procedure refers to how decisions are made, who
participates and on what terms. Recognition is typically concerned
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2003); it is about the extent to which different agents, ideas and cul-
tures are respected and valued in interpersonal encounters and in pub-
lic discourse and practice.We focus on recognition becausewe think it is
highly relevant to conservation conﬂicts and because it is comparatively
poorly understood and neglected.
It is not pragmatic to seek a single deﬁnition of justice-as-recognition
because this would ignore important differences in understanding, in-
cluding among political philosophers. Instead we ﬁnd it a necessary ﬁrst
step to provide a roadmap to the plural ways in which recognition has
been understood, both in theory and in practice, and to relate this to con-
temporary conservation conﬂicts. Our approach is therefore to describe
different traditions of thinking and to illustrate these through case studies.
We then proceed to a synthesis discussion in which we explore how ele-
ments of common spirit or intent can be drawn together in order tomake
key aspects of the concept of recognition legible to conservation practice.
Prior to this,we brieﬂy review recent attention to justicewithin conserva-
tion practice.
2. Conservation practice, justice and recognition
Biodiversity conservation is linked with recognition injustices for
three main reasons. Firstly, protected areas (PAs) are spatially associat-
ed with cultural diversity (Gorenﬂo et al., 2012; Stepp et al., 2004) and
with people whose knowledge and environmental governance institu-
tions are vulnerable to being marginalised (Brosius and Hitchner,
2010; Escobar, 1998). Secondly, mainstream conservationmanagement
strategies are inﬂuenced by culturally speciﬁc (and often disputed)
ideas about what works and about what counts as evidence of what
works. For example conservation approaches have been driven by the
assumed superiority of exclusionary models of protected areas in
which people are separated from the rest of nature (Lele et al., 2010;
West et al., 2006). Thirdly, these dominant blueprints about how con-
servation should be done become a basis for the misrepresentation
and misrecognition of indigenous and local people. For example, the
‘Yosemite model’ of conservation, in which nature is conceived as wil-
derness, has led to the representation of local and indigenous lifestyles
as harmful to nature conservation (Cronon, 1996; Dowie, 2009;
Stevens, 1997). Given the powerful assumption that conservation
holds the moral high ground, these lifestyles are also therefore
portrayed as morally inferior (Martin et al., 2013; Neumann, 2004).
But biodiversity conservation can also work constructively with local
communities, especially if it embraces the concept of recognition.
Where innovative, non-exclusionary models are developed, indigenous
people have sometimes embraced protected areas as away to positively
promote both their territories and traditions (Stevens, 1997).
The language of equity and rights has been in global conservation
discourse since at least the early 1970s (UNEP, 1972). In the 1980s,
ideas of inter- and intra-generational equity were foundational to pop-
ular narratives of sustainable development (WCED, 1987) that fed into
the ﬁrst ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. The Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) was one of the outcomes of this summit and builds on three ob-
jectives: ‘the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the beneﬁts arising
out of the utilisation of genetic resources’ (Art. 1). The 2010Nagoya Pro-
tocol develops the third objective of access and beneﬁt sharing (ABS)
whilst ‘taking into account the important role of traditional knowledge’
(Secretariat of the CBD 2010, preamble). The inclusion of equitable ABS
is something that was pushed for by developing country stakeholders
who feared a highly preservationist CBD and expected ﬁnancial returns
from the exploitation of their genetic resources and traditional knowl-
edge (Broggiato et al., 2015). However, it is worth noting that both the
process and implementation of the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol have
led to controversies over recognition. One charge is that the CBD and
Nagoya are culturally dominating, requiring prospective beneﬁciaries
to assimilate imposed ideas of what is fair and equitable as a conditionof beneﬁting (De Jonge, 2011; Suiseeya, 2014;Whiteman, 2009). For ex-
ample, the San people are expected to conform to norms of fair proce-
dure rooted in western principles of representative democracy in
order to negotiate an ABS agreement related to the Hoodia plant
(Vermeylen and Walker, 2011).
With regard to its ﬁrst two objectives, the CBD pays attention to cul-
tural diversity and the identity of indigenous peoples in the much-
quoted Articles 8j and 10c which respectively demand that Parties to
the Convention protect indigenous and local communities' knowledge,
practices and lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity. Nevertheless, Parties to the Convention have time
and again adopted policies that conﬂict with traditional ethics of stew-
ardship of nature, notably with regard to the so-called “marketisation”
of nature. An outstanding example is Decision 30 on “Incentive
Measures” taken at COP-11 of the CBD which strongly encourages
Parties to include the economic valuation of nature in their national
conservation programmes. Such approaches are regularly resisted by
indigenous peoples' representatives but gain more and more traction
with governments.
One of the overriding criticisms of existing global attempts to for-
malise aspects of conservation equity would seem to be the lack of rec-
ognition of other cultures and other ways of thinking about justice in
relation to the environment. Without attention to the equal status of
others' ways of seeing theworld, attempts to deﬁne conservation justice
are likely to reproduce dominant (western) conceptions about what
constitutes equitable distribution, procedure and recognition. Such a
concern is not conﬁned to state representatives at global forums. At Na-
goya, conservation NGOs were seen to align with the interests of states,
pressing to bypass discussion of foundational questions about how con-
servation justice is to be deﬁned (Suiseeya, 2014). In conservation plan-
ning and practice, recognition has not featured centrally either.
Biodiversity conservation programmes have largely been informed by
scientiﬁc principles, and have thus targeted nationally representative
ecosystems, taking account of species rarity and diversity, recreational
value, and level of threat (Margules et al., 2002). Conservation has his-
torically been characterized by territorial and natural resourcemanage-
ment conﬂicts, where distinct values and interests collide. For example,
the move towards people-centred conservation since the 1980s has
rendered mixed results and made evident how difﬁcult it can be to rec-
oncile the ideas and aspirations of conservation practitioners with those
of local people and other actors (Adams et al., 2004; Wells et al., 1992).
As of today, conservation is still marked by a lack of willingness to en-
gage fullywith different and changingbeliefs about nature, or to explore
diverse, culturally-suited implementation approaches instead of relying
on blueprints (Reyers et al., 2010).
3. Thinking about recognition in conservation justice
Whilst we are arguing for more concerted consideration for recogni-
tion within conservation practice, we also acknowledge that its applica-
tion remains difﬁcult, not least because of contested meanings and
approaches. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to shed
light on these differences and to reveal common, core concerns that
can serve as a basis for progress. In doing so we draw on four contribu-
tory schools of thinking: Hegel's theory of recognition, critical theory,
decolonial theory and the capabilities approach (all deﬁned below).
There is considerable theoretical overlap between the ﬁrst three of
these, but we separate them analytically because they are distinct in
terms of the scholars using them, their geographical focus, and the
kind of responses they call for. We employ a simple conceptual frame-
work that decomposes these approaches to deﬁning recognition into
four components: subjects, harms, mechanisms and responses.
Subjects of justice refer to the stakeholders or users who are entitled
to moral consideration: those who hold rights and deserve recogni-
tion (Sikor et al., 2014). One debate is about the spatial and temporal
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responsibility for those in distant states, or for those not yet born.
Moral concern for future generations is almost a deﬁning feature of
environmental justice (Dobson, 2003) and despite some scholars'
difﬁculties of asserting responsibility across national boundaries
(Nagel, 2005; Rawls, 1971), recognition theorists now tend to argue
that we are global citizens with global responsibilities (Fraser, 2009;
Honneth, 2014; Young, 2010). A second debate pits individualism
against communitarianism. Liberal traditions of justice tend to
prioritise the individual as the subject of justice, whilst communitar-
ians argue that communities can also be harmed and therefore de-
serve recognition (Sandel, 1998; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010).
Such communitarian ethics also feature strongly in African and Latin
American indigenous philosophies (Biko, 1998; López, 2013). A third
debate concerns expanding the reach of moral responsibility to em-
brace non-humans (Nussbaum, 2007; Schlosberg, 2013, Singer
1995). Finally, moral responsibility towards the spiritual world is
central to many Latin American indigenous peoples' notions of envi-
ronmental justice (e.g. de Castro, 2012).
Harms are the kinds of injustices suffered by moral subjects and can
vary according to the dimension of environmental justice. Distributive
injustice is more likely to result in objective material harm such as im-
poverishment whilst misrecognition tends to be linked with harms to
subjective wellbeing such as reduced self-esteem. However, we will
see that there is an important debate about whether the harms from
misrecognition are purely subjective and psychological, or whether
they are inextricably bound up with material harms.
Mechanisms refer here to the institutional and structural explana-
tions for injustices. How canwe explain how similar injustices appear re-
peatedly, in different places and times? Very broadly speaking, causal
explanations fall into ideational and material camps: Either one argues
that the roots of oppression are found in the realm of ideas and culture,
or that they are found in the economic structures of society (Atkinson,
1991; Parsons, 2007). But there are also middle positions, in which cul-
tural and economic forces are viewed as operating in tandem
(Coulthard, 2007).
Responses. Finally, it is inevitable that traditions that identify
different harms and mechanisms will also propose different solution
frameworks. For some, responses can start with individual efforts at
self-development, such as recognizing one's connectedness to the rest
of nature (e.g. Naess and Rothenberg, 1990). For others, a more political
project is required, such as extending participatory democracy (Dryzek,
2000; Sen, 2009), redeﬁning national constitutions to allow plural no-
tions of citizenship (Walsh, 2007), or giving voice to alternatives to cap-
italism such as degrowth and Buen Vivir2 (Escobar, 2016).
Table 1 summarises these four components of environmental justice
for four traditions of thinking about recognition: Hegelianism, critical
theory, decolonialism and capabilities. We now proceed to discuss
each of these in turn.
3.1. Hegelianism and recognition
The German philosopher Georg Hegel (1770–1831) is considered
the founder of the continental European ethics of recognition. Hegel
conceived the struggle against injustice – indeed the whole history of
humanity's struggle for freedom – in terms of an essential need to be
recognized and respected by others. For Hegel, such recognition is
deemed essential because it is the basis of individual freedom. Failure2 The literal translation of Buen Vivir in Quechua and Aymara languages is “To Live in
Plenitude”. It refers to a contemporary non-capitalist ideology that has recently blossomed
in South America with roots in indigenous and non-western conceptions of human wel-
fare and of nature. Buen Vivir is a holistic concept rooted in principles and values such as
harmony, equilibrium and complementarity, which from an indigenous perspective must
guide the relationship of human beings with each other, with nature (or Mother Earth)
and the cosmos.to respect important constituents of a person's cultural identity, such
as their beliefs about nature, is a denial of their freedom of thought
and freedom to live according to their chosen belief system. Such free-
doms are protected today in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples. For example, the latter requires parties to recognize “the right of all
peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be
respected as such”.
One of the most important insights from Hegel is that human free-
dom cannot be achieved unilaterally but only through social relation-
ships of a psychological nature. Such relationships can be described as
‘inter-subjective’ interactions inevitably occur between persons who
are more and less powerful. For Hegel, recognition injustice was a
form of enslavement that occurred through unequal encounters in
which the more powerful actor fails to recognize the value of the
other. The critical point here is that a person can only really value
their own life if they see that others value such a life. For example, it is
not possible to have high self-esteem if you perceive that others treat
you with contempt. One's psychological sense of worth is formed by
how others act towards you; or putmore fundamentally, one's freedom
is achieved or denied through psychological encounters with others.
This is very relevant to biodiversity conservation because a person
might only be able to enjoy cultural freedom if their ways of knowing
and living with nature are respected by others.
The denial of recognition leads to fundamental harms of a psycho-
logical nature. Fanon (1967) saw such psychological harm as funda-
mental to the lasting injustices of colonialism in Africa. Others
consider such psychological harms to contribute to the health problems
faced by some indigenous peoples today (Ohenjo et al., 2006). If we ac-
cept such a characterization of harm and injustice, some difﬁcult ques-
tions are posed for a more just conservation. How, for example should
conservation proceed in states, such as Rwanda, that continue with as-
similationist policies towards indigenous and local peoples (Dawson
and Martin, 2015; Ohenjo et al., 2006)?
For Hegel the mechanism of subjugation was psychological and the
required response was to move relations towards more reciprocal rec-
ognition. In contemporary terms, this is a call for multiculturalism,
which involves afﬁrmative attempts to revalue previously denigrated
cultures. As becomes clear below, we are sceptical that such a change
in social encounters is sufﬁcient in the absence of an accompanying
transformation of underlying economic and political powers. But by
the same measure, we should conclude that economic reforms (such
as access and beneﬁt sharing or payments for ecosystem services) are
equally unlikely to achieve justice without accompanying attention to
intersubjective relationships. For Fanon (1967) for example, the end of
direct colonial economic and political rule was not sufﬁcient to emanci-
pate Africans from the internalised sense of inferiority that had been
forced upon them.3.2. Critical theory and recognition
Critical theory is a neo-Marxist school of thought characterized by its
emancipatory ambitions and by its alignment with prevailing social
movements (Fraser, 1985; Horkheimer, 1982). In the past, such move-
ments have been dominated by calls for economic redistribution to re-
solve class-based injustices. But in the late 20th century there
emerged new social movements linked to cultural identity struggles
(Habermas, 1981), including indigenous peoples movements and ele-
ments of environmentalism. Whilst old social movements struggled
for more just division of resources, new ones engage in ‘indivisible con-
ﬂicts’ arising over goods for which distribution makes little sense, such
as ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ (Honneth, 2004). Fraser develops a theoretical
framing that attends to both old and new struggles, framing injustice in
terms of inter-twined cultural and economic forces. She proposes that a
critical theory of recognition needs to reveal ‘the ways in which
Table 1
Summary of different schools of thinking about recognition.
Hegelianism Critical theory Decolonialism Capabilities
Subjects Individual humans embedded
in social relations.
Individual humans and social groups. Humans (ancestors, present, future),
non-humans, spirits, mother nature.
Individual humans; potentially human
and non-human communities.
Harms Psychological, e.g. loss of
self-esteem.
Psychological, social, political and material. Psychological, material and cultural. Constrained opportunities; loss of
freedom/dignity.
Mechanisms Non- recognition caused by
cultural relations of power.
Status inequalities caused by cultural and
economic forces.
Colonisation by Eurocentric, modernist
knowledge production.
Value universalism, lack of
participation.
Responses Afﬁrmative recognition for
multi-culturalism
Afﬁrmative recognition of difference and
economic and political redistribution.
Prioritise indigenous knowledge;
political and economic change
Liberal pluralism & multiculturalism;
deliberative public debate.
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with and support one another’ (Fraser, 1997).
A critical theory approach to recognition does not obviously differ in
terms of the subjects of justice it identiﬁes, but differs fundamentally
from a Hegelian account of recognition in terms of the nature of
harms, the mechanisms by which these are produced, and putative so-
lution frameworks. For Fraser, misrecognition is about social mecha-
nisms which produce status differences that harm the opportunities of
some social groups. Societies develop hierarchies of cultural values
that degrade the status of some groups of people, thereby culturally
subordinating them and denying equality of social interaction. Such sta-
tus injustices are reproduced through formal institutions, such as prop-
erty laws that discriminate against indigenous forms of tenure, or
against women, but also through informal institutions including cultur-
al norms and prejudices.
Fraser reconciles this observation about cultural status with more
traditional Marxist economic analysis, identifying twin mechanisms
that produce injustices. Injustices arise out of a combination of econom-
ic exploitation and cultural subordination, neither of which can be ana-
lytically subsumed under the other (Fraser, 1995; Fraser and Honneth,
2003). Gender inequality for example has connected roots in both
economic arrangements (e.g. rules of resource access) and culture
(Robeyns, 2003; Young, 2010). Responses to these status-based harms
need to be multi-dimensional. As with Hegelian thinking, there is a
need for afﬁrmative efforts to tackle cultural misrecognition (Fraser,
2000). But to achieve parity of participation there is also a need to trans-
form institutions that deﬁne distribution and political representation
(Fraser, 2009).
Fraser's struggle of choice is feminism and she has not herself ad-
dressed issues of environmental justice. Nevertheless, her combined
focus on recognition and distribution appears fruitful for a critical theo-
ry of conservation justice. Firstly, economic inequalities are often con-
sidered to be drivers of biodiversity loss, both through mechanisms of
impoverishment of some groups that undermine sustainable practices,
and the corresponding enrichment of others that fuels proﬂigate con-
sumption. Secondly, however, this is only ever part of the story (Roe
and Elliott, 2005) because material practices are entwined with status
inequalities and political marginalisation. Our ﬁrst case study, below, il-
lustrates the ways in which failures of recognition serve to undermine
traditional knowledge and cultures whilst also highlighting how such
cultural subjugation operates in tandemwith forms of political and eco-
nomic inequality.
3.2.1. Case Study 1: Seeding recognition in France
AgroBio Perigord (ABP) is an association for the development of or-
ganic farming in Dordogne, a department in southwestern France.
Among other things, ABP is known for its activities of in situ conserva-
tion of local and regional plant landraces threatened by genetic erosion
(called ‘conservation varieties’ or ‘peasant varieties’). It is a keymember
of the nation-wide Peasant Seed Network (‘Réseau Semences Paysanne’),
and hosts a community seedbank (‘Maison de la Semence’) for both pro-
fessional farmers and home gardeners.
In 2000, the foundingmembers of ABP started gathering and reusing
local plant landraces as an act of resistance to the use of so-called ‘elite’varieties (commercial pure lines or F1 hybrids). Under the banner of
‘peasant farming’ (‘agriculture paysanne’), a term previously restricted
to subsistence agriculture in the global South (Ploeg, 2008), the under-
lying struggle aims at the cultural recognition of small-scale, farmer-
driven agriculture, through the reintroduction of local landraces. But
local landraces are useless without the associated local agroecological
knowledge and practice, which had been largely lost since the emer-
gence of industrial agriculture in Western Europe in the second half of
the twentieth century. Therefore, in 2001, ABP launched a participatory
plant-breeding programme to select andmultiply environment-speciﬁc
breeds and foster the conservation of local plant landraces through their
utilization. In order to reacquire know-how and breeding techniques,
each farmer breeds a certain amount of local landraces on a testing par-
cel, and commits tomultiply and return two-thirds of the initial amount
of seed to the community seedbank. Through peer-based ‘farm-talks’,
participatory plant breeding takes the form of the social learning plat-
form in which farmer-driven knowledge not only gains ‘scientiﬁc’ rec-
ognition, but is also enriched through the active participation of other
local farmers and partner scientists. On top of cultural and scientiﬁc rec-
ognition, the association also claims legal recognition. As the use of
peasant varieties is currently unregulated under French law, they are
considered ‘phytogenetic resources’, which can only be exchanged for
experimental purposes. The domination of corporate seed remains
protected by a system of Plant Variety Rights that leaves alternative
seed users legally invisible.
Historically, the creation of ABPwas triggered by the reaction of local
farmers to having been sold ‘organic’maize seed that had been contam-
inated with genetically modiﬁed genes. But the re-emergence of peas-
ant agriculture is also part of a broader opposition to the way in which
the agricultural economy is organized. Agricultural policy serves the in-
terest of amarket-only logic, and the sector is characterized bymultina-
tional companies' increasing control over agronomic research (Bonneuil
and Thomas, 2009).
The conservation activities undertaken by ABP should therefore be
seen as a combination of struggles for the recognition of farmers and
for more economic equality. Justice claims take on a combined charac-
ter, denouncing both the socio-cultural subordination of small-scale
farmers and their economic exploitation by the dominant agri-food sys-
tem (Coolsaet, 2015). In 2011, ABP co-signed the declaration of the
European Forum on agricultural biodiversity “Let's Liberate Diversity”,
adopted in Szeged, Hungary. It demanded of “the European Union and
all of its Member States recognition that European farmers are also con-
tributing to the conservation of plant genetic resources” and that poli-
cies “take into account the right to food sovereignty […] the right to
preserve local cultural heritage,” and the right of farmers to freely deﬁne
their farming practices.
3.3. Decolonial thought and recognition
Decolonial thinking has roots in both Hegelianism and critical theo-
ry, emphasising forms of inter-subjective, social, cultural and political
subordination that deny freedom and opportunity to some groups.
However, it is also distinct for its focus on the global South and for iden-
tifying mechanisms of subordination in Eurocentric scientiﬁc and
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from Latin America (Escobar, 2007; Leff, 2001; Mignolo, 2008; Quijano
2000), but also from India (Visvanathan, 1997), Portugal (de Santos
et al., 2007; de Santos, 2010) and New Zealand (Smith, 1999) among
others.
According to this body of theory colonialism ended when the global
South gained political independence. However, ‘coloniality’ is a process
of subjugation that persists through the expansion of a European cultur-
al worldview. This dominating European culture is institutionalised
through education, the media, state-sanctioned languages and behav-
ioural norms. Thus, coloniality is a mechanism of recognition injustice
that creates structural oppression over marginalised sectors of society
whose alternative worldviews become devalued and stigmatised.
Decoloniality scholarship is inspired by indigenous peoples'movements
and their struggles against modernity (Mignolo, 2008). It therefore has
links to indigenous cosmogonies, leading to conceptions of justice sub-
jects that emphasise community over individuals (López, 2013) and in-
cludes moral responsibilities towards mother nature and intangible
beings such as spirits.
Decoloniality argues that forced assimilation to modernity leads to
profound psychological harms to indigenous peoples, eroding vital con-
ditions for their wellbeing such as cultural identity, freedom of belief,
and self-respect. But coloniality also leads to more tangible impacts on
status and participation by disregarding local notions of authority and
territory, frequently resulting in displacement or enforced change to
livelihoods. Decolonial theories describe mechanisms of harm that re-
semble those of Fraser's critical theory. Accordingly, psychological and
physical harm is perpetuated through political and economic power
which operating in connection with knowledge-based discursive
power produce harms to identities and subjective being. Thus, re-
sponses to coloniality necessarily involve decolonizing power, knowl-
edge and being. This involves moving away from a unitary model of
citizenship and civilization to one that respects different local econo-
mies, politics, cultures, epistemologies and forms of knowledge.
Conservation practice is primarily linked to the coloniality of knowl-
edge, because it forms part of a dominant form of knowledge produc-
tion (western science), institutionalised within bodies such as the
CBD, which has marginalized local forms of knowledge (Visvanathan,
1997; de Santos, 2010). Thus, responding to conservation injustices
must include democratizing science itself by creating opportunities for
intercultural dialogues as part of the knowledge production process
(Walsh, 2007). Case study two explores how this means prioritizing
the indigenous world view and its concerns ‘and then coming to know
and understand theory and research’ from that perspective (Smith,
1999).
3.3.1. Case Study 2: Pluricultural politics, intercultural dialogues and
cognitive justice in Canaima National Park, Venezuela
Canaima National Park is located in southeastern Venezuela, near
the border with Brazil and Guyana, and inside the ancestral territory
of the Pemon Indigenous Peoples. Since the park was established, the
Pemon have been in conﬂict with environmental authorities and have
made claims for territorial rights and self-determination. Tensions
arose due to conﬂicting land use demands and because the park was
established on ancestral territory without consultation or local consent.
With an estimated population of 20,000, many Pemon still maintain
their traditional system of scattered nuclear family settlements. Their
lifestyle is based largely on traditional activities: agriculture, ﬁshing,
hunting and gathering, although there is more and more work in tour-
ism and, for the younger generation, public posts.
The Park's designation has helped protect the Pemon's territory, but
they still view it as a threat to their existence. This is a result of a style of
environmental management and development planning which has
failed to recognize the area's cultural value for the Pemon, their environ-
mental knowledge or their notions of authority and territory
(Rodriguez, 2014). One area of conﬂict is the traditional practices ofslash and burn agriculture and savannah burning that are considered a
threat to watershed and soil conservation by park managers. There are
also conﬂicting views about how to manage the inﬂux of tourists into
the Park and how to distribute the corresponding beneﬁts, and conﬂicts
over projects of strategic interest for the Venezuelan Government, such
as the building of a high-voltage power line to export electricity to Brazil
(1997–2000), and the installation of a satellite sub-base (2007).
Misrecognition has been at the core of all conﬂicts, which the Pemon
have dealtwith by resorting to a variety of strategies, including silent re-
sistance (in the case of ﬁre use practices) and more overt ones. In the
case of tourism and large scale development this has included direct vi-
olence, law suits and political and social mobilization, which in the par-
ticular case of the power-line conﬂict, unfolded into a national
indigenous movement demanding constitutional changes to the nation
state to incorporate legal rights to cultural difference. This was achieved
in 1999 with a new national constitution in which Venezuela became a
pluri-cultural state.
Since the mid-1990s, and to cope with conﬂicts and rapid cultural
change, the Pemon have been developing their own “Life Plan”, the
ideological, spiritual and philosophical foundation to visualize and de-
ﬁne a desired future, based on reconstructing their history and cultural
identity. An imperative to move forward in constructing a Pemon Life
Plan has been developing capacities and participatory methodologies
for community analysis and planning. For this purpose, they have
been supported by a series of collaborations with external actors who
have incorporated the “Life Plan” agenda within their research projects,
thereby generating opportunities for intercultural dialogue and the ar-
ticulation of traditional and scientiﬁc knowledge in Protected Area
(PA) management, particularly related to ﬁre management. More spe-
ciﬁcally, this has involved help with participatory historical reconstruc-
tions, territorial self-demarcation processes, and community reﬂection
about socio-ecological changes and a desired future. These activities
have been decisive for the Pemon, revealing ﬁre management knowl-
edge that challenges conventional explanations of landscape change.
This local knowledge, combined with results from studies of Pemon
ﬁre regimes, ﬁre behaviour ecology and paleo-ecological research,
now inform a counter narrative of landscape change that is inﬂuencing
a shift in environmental discourse and policy making towards an inter-
cultural ﬁre management approach (Rodríguez et al., 2013).
3.4. Capabilities and recognition
The capabilities approach argues that what is relevant for justice is
whether individual persons as subjects of justice have the freedom to re-
alise the objectives they have in life (Nussbaum, 2007; Sen, 1993; Sen,
1999). In other words, the ‘good’ to which justice aspires is deﬁned in
terms of a person's opportunities or ‘capabilities’ rather than their actual
achievements (Sen, 1999). Such capabilities are clearly dependent on a
range of conditions, including economic distribution and cultural recog-
nition. The capabilities approach has therefore provided environmental
justice scholars with another way of framing links between distribution
and recognition (an alternative to Fraser's critical theory) (Martin et al.,
2015; Schlosberg, 2013).
Whilst Sen and Nussbaum do not explicitly use the terminology of
‘recognition’, the capabilities approach offers a comprehensive view of
the conditions needed for a good life that incorporates aspects of recog-
nition, participation and distribution (Robeyns, 2003; Schlosberg, 2007;
Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). Nussbaum, for example, includes the
requirement for people to have “the social bases of self-respect and
nonhumiliation […] [which] entails provisions of nondiscrimination
on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, na-
tional origin” (Nussbaum, 2007, 77).
Whilst capabilities thinking stems from liberal individualism, envi-
ronmental justice scholars have started to explore its potential to ac-
commodate communitarian approaches to the subjects of social
justice, for example through the idea of ‘community capabilities’
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inclusion of non-human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2007; Schlosberg,
2007). Nonhuman animals can evidently ﬂourish or not ﬂourish based
on their capabilities, and thismight serve as a basis for human duties to-
wards them (Armstrong, 2012; Cripps, 2010).
The nature of harms considered by capabilities thinkers is somewhat
contested. A personwhohas fewer capabilities to accomplishwhat they
reasonably value would be regarded as less well-off than others (Sen,
2009, 231). In that sense, injustice is the denial of choice. However,
there is less agreement about whether there are universal thresholds
for certain capabilities that can serve as benchmarks for justice. It
seems clear that some things are universally essential for a digniﬁed
life – sufﬁcient food for example – and that failure to strive to provide
these essentials will always be unjust. But going beyond examples like
food and water becomes contentious (Gough, 2004). Sen assumes a
‘thin universalism’: that beyond basic needs peoplewill pursue different
and context-speciﬁc ends (Sen, 1993). In contrast, Nussbaum assumes a
‘thicker universalism’: there is a comprehensive set of capabilities that
are essential for “a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human
being” (Nussbaum, 2007, 70).
Even though there is this element of universalism, one of the impor-
tant insights from capabilities thinking is the idea thatwhat constitutes a
meaningful life for an individualwill not be predominantly universal, but
mediated by various social and cultural values. Identity is viewed as com-
plex,multiple and dynamic, such that attempts to reduce people's values
to a simple, collective label are seen as ‘the appalling miniaturisation of
people’ (Sen, 2007). Whilst the capabilities approach does not directly
describe mechanisms of injustice (it is not a theory as such), it is implied
that injustice arises from forms of governance and democracy that lead
to suchminiaturisation. In terms of responses, justice requires that indi-
vidual humans (and perhaps communities and non-humans) be granted
thepolitical conditions that enable them to live the lives that they choose
as meaningful. This is an everyday confrontation for the conservation
sector because maintaining biodiversity and ecological processes is inti-
mately entwined with, and can often conﬂict with, valued ways of life
(Holland, 2007, 2014; Polishchuk and Rauschmayer, 2012; Sikor et al.,
2014). Our third case study illustrates the ways in which policies to pro-
mote biodiversity conservation often form part of wider land manage-
ment and development strategies, such as farming intensiﬁcation, rural
modernisation and formalisation of rights,which are ultimately assimila-
tionist and conﬂict with alternative ways of knowing and living with
nature.
3.4.1. Case study 3: The Twa people and misrecognition in Rwanda
In Rwanda, a small and densely populated country, only a few isolat-
ed areas of natural forest remain. Strict conservation through PAs has
occurred with some beneﬁts for all interest groups, but with some neg-
ative impacts felt locally. In particular, the indigenous Twa people
inhabited Rwanda's forests into the late 20th century and strict forest
protection stripped them of culturally valued resources and livelihood
choices, forcing incorporation into mainstream society and occupations
(Beswick, 2011). Subsequently many Twa ﬁnd themselves landless, re-
lying on extremely lowpaid agricultural labouring (Dawson andMartin,
2015). The costs of conservation interventions can be seen to have de-
niedmany Twa adequate nutrition aswell as the ability to live according
to their culturally valued practices. The harms that have been imposed
are produced concurrently by injustices of distribution and recognition:
denial of land resources goes hand in hand with denial of the practices
they deemmeaningful.
Iris Marion Young (2010) describes how discrimination tends to
have both institutional roots in the formal apparatus of states, as well
as more diffuse cultural roots. This is clearly the case for Rwanda's
Twa people. Post-genocide, Rwanda has been governedwith very limit-
ed tolerance of parallel institutions to suit alternative cultural prefer-
ences. Ethnic reconciliation has been enshrined in law to redeﬁne all
as Rwandans (Purdeková, 2008) and to forbid use of ethnic labels(Waldorf, 2011). The Twa are no longer to be called the Twa, but the
‘historically marginalised people of Rwanda’. Institutional failures of
recognition are matched by widespread cultural discrimination that
contributes to the low status suffered by the Twa.
Whilst manufactured blindness to ethnic or cultural groups may
constitute a recognition injustice, so too might the collapsing
(miniaturisation) of individuals into simpliﬁed group identities. Identi-
ties rarely remain unaltered and boundaries between interacting groups
are not ﬁxed, but complex and dynamic (Bierschenk, 1988). Although
groups with different cultural values can be identiﬁed in Rwanda
based on their origin and history, distinctions between the three
broad ethnic labels (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) as farmers, pastoralists or
forest-dwellers are often crude simpliﬁcations (Pottier, 2002) and also
overlook considerable intra-group variation. For example some Twa
may highlight cultural links to forests, whilst others have lived whole
lives next to forests but pursued completely unrelated livelihoods. In
line with Sen's liberal pluralism, this necessitates a multifaceted ap-
proach to understanding and responding to recognition injustices. In
the case of the Twa, responses to address issues of recognition may
need not only to be attentive to cultural differences and restorative in
nature but also to attend to the varied and changing aspirations
expressed.
Attention to recognition poses a challenge to how conservation can
seek to offset costs with beneﬁts. In Rwanda, a small proportion of tour-
ism revenues are provided, in kind, to local inhabitants, in addition to
some employment and income generating opportunities. However
these beneﬁts don't always reach those whose choices have been
most curtailed and are at any rate not always commensurable with
what has been lost. Beneﬁts are geographically concentrated in areas
with greatest infrastructure and accrue almost exclusively to the
wealthiest, whether as jobs, livestock or establishment of farming coop-
eratives (Dawson and Martin, 2015). A Twa community living adjacent
to one forest they had previously inhabited were granted ‘traditional’
costumes to perform dances for tourists and earn an income. In the ab-
sence of alternatives such opportunities are well received, but some
Twa say they would prefer interventions that address their inequality
of status, to provide an opportunity to reduce the everyday ethnic dis-
crimination that they suffer. For example they would value training
that enabled them to work and to manage their own money and
cooperatives.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Hvalkof (2000) catalogues a history of atrocities against peoples of
the upper Amazon. He ﬁnishes with a warning that if conservationists
arrive in this landscape determined to impose their particular ways of
valuing and governing nature, then they are really not much better
than the oil and rubber barons who have come before. Such a caution
applies asmuch to global institutions as it does to ﬁeld level operations.
As Escobar (1998) argues, forums such as the CBD can be vital spaces for
opening up intercultural dialogue or they can be dominated bywestern
knowledge and agendas. Our empirical cases illustrate that such ten-
sions between the potential costs and beneﬁts of conservation are
very much alive. PAs may help to protect much that is dear to the
Pemon people in Venezuela and the Twa in Rwanda, but perversely,
conservation has also become a threat to their existence as indigenous
peoples. The case of ABP in France, however, suggests that the science
of (agro)biodiversity conservation can also be part of a dialogue be-
tween different ways of doing and knowing conservation, which,
when community-driven, can help to oppose the institutional threats
to their knowledge and livelihoods.
There are some important differences between the theories of recog-
nition that we have outlined here and summarised in Table 1. For Hege-
lian scholars recognition requires self-development and afﬁrmative
multiculturalismasmethods to seekmutual recognition; for critical the-
orists it requires institutional and structural reforms to bring about
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non-modern conceptions of life that have been denied by enfoldment
into western knowledge systems; for capabilities thinkers, the condi-
tions for human freedom will require liberal deliberative democracy.
There are also similarities, however. When focused on the conservation
sector, all of these theoretical and political lenses suggest the need to
strive for more equitable spaces of engagement. The responsibility to
do this stems from the responsibility to prevent harm and to strive to
ensure people have the capabilities to live in dignity. This responsibility
extends to governments, NGOs and the wider public who support and
beneﬁt from conservation. As Young (2010) suggests, responsibility is
not evenly distributed but falls more to those in a position of power to
effect change, and those who have the privilege of beneﬁting from con-
servation whilst not being exposed to the corresponding costs.
Whilst we are not in a position to provide detailed guidelines as to
how to enact these responsibilities, we think that the ideas discussed
in this paper provide robust theoretical support for some actions. First
and foremost, there is a need to move beyond a distributive model of
thinking about the social beneﬁts and costs of conservation. A distribu-
tive analytical approach is important and can provide real insights into
failures of recognition. For example, quantitative studies of the distribu-
tion of costs of toxic pollutants in the US revealed underlying causes in
status inequalities linked to race and class (Warren, 1999) and studies
of the displacement of people for conservation emphasise the historical
burden suffered by indigenous peoples (Dowie, 2009). But the theories
of recognition reviewed here also reveal the limitations of a distributive
model and, in doing so, identify categories of concern that require addi-
tional coverage.
Secondly, building on this point, the social impacts of conserva-
tion are in large part relational, whether this is taken in a Hegelian
sense that inequitable relationships constitute the harm itself, or
more in line with feminist, critical and decolonial scholars, that this
is part of a broader structuring of social relations that produces low
status for some groups. We therefore need to explore and develop
analytical and practical ways to pursue relational aspects of environ-
mental justice.
Thirdly, as we develop practices that attend to these relational con-
cerns, we can be guided by the concerns over the status of peasant cul-
tures and knowledge worldwide, which are central to both the threats
and opportunities that biodiversity conservation brings in our case
studies. Whilst the CBD is committed to recognising different knowl-
edge, it is clear that ways of working across alternative ways of perceiv-
ing and valuing nature are still not widely effective. As a ﬁrst step,
improving recognition is about acknowledging that conservation can
produce these kinds of harms as well as providing opportunities for
their alleviation. A second step involves changing power relations and
moving towards relationships of more equal inﬂuence. For example,
changing the legal and economic institutions to allow small farmers'
choice to engage in locally-valued land use practices, such as to plant
the seeds they want, or changing the formal tenure of indigenous terri-
tories to enable local control over land use and political autonomy.
This brings us to the fourth and ﬁnal requirement, namely that equi-
table inﬂuence over decision-making will rarely be served by use of
pre-deﬁned blueprints for biodiversity conservation, whether it be
models for protected areas or market-based instruments. Such
blueprints, such as the ‘ecosystem services’ model, are themselves
institutionalisations of particular (western)ways of knowing and valuing
nature and can act as barriers that prevent consideration of alternative
knowledge and values. By contrast, practices such as the intercultural di-
alogue between external actors and the Pemon may help to open up the
space for more genuine integration of conservation and development.
We realise that such practices represent real challenges for ﬁeld level
conservation, in terms of resource constraints, methods and training,
and in some cases political constraints. But if we are serious about the
commitment for conservation to be equitable, engaging with issues of
recognition is a necessary step to take.Acknowledgements
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